参院選の結果と沖縄の未来<English付>

エルドリッヂ研究所代表・政治学博士 ロバート・D・エルドリッヂ

ロバート・D・エルドリッヂ現実直視せず自民敗北

政府の政策推進一層困難に

 選挙結果を見る二つの方法がある。自分自身の努力で相手候補に勝ったのか、それとも、相手候補が弱かったから勝てたのか。

 10日に投開票された参院選の沖縄選挙区に当てはめてみると、新人の伊波洋一氏が独自の力で当選したのか、それとも、現職の島尻安伊子氏が敗北したのかということになる。

 筆者がこの問いに答えるとすれば、後者だと答えるであろう。伊波氏が勝ったというより、島尻氏が負けたのだ。厳しすぎると思う人もいるかもしれないが、沖縄の政治と政治家を20年以上、注意深く観察した者としては、そう描写する以外にない。

 島尻氏が良い人ではないと言っているのではない。政治家、または、閣僚のメンバーとしてしっかり働かなかったわけでもない。伊波氏の陣営による選挙違反を非難しなかったからというわけでもない。実際にはたくさんあったようだ。

 ここで言いたいのは、与党・自民党が数々の難しい判断を先送りし、現実を直視しなかったことが、沖縄で問題を引き起こしたということだ。島尻氏は2014年の秋、直面する課題に立ち向かわなければ参院選挙に負ける、とある有識者から警告を受けた。14年の沖縄県知事選に向けても安倍政権は13年に同様の警告を受けたが、助言を無視して敗北した。

 ご存じのように、自民党の支援を受けて3期目の当選を目指した現職の県知事は大敗を喫し、その翌月12月の衆院選でも沖縄選挙区の自民党の候補は4人全員敗北した。そして今回、07年に参院選に初当選し、10年に再選された島尻氏は10万票以上の差をつけられ、議席を失った。

 これで、沖縄選挙区の衆院議員4人と参院議員の伊波氏、そしてもう1人の参院議員、沖縄社会大衆党の糸数慶子氏と、全員が野党議員として当選したことになる。全員が野党議員になったのは沖縄が本土復帰して以来、初めてのことだ。彼らは反基地思想を持ち、特に普天間飛行場(宜野湾市)の名護市辺野古のキャンプ・シュワブ沿岸への移設に強く反対している。

 攻撃的で感情的な伊波氏が、偏ったイデオロギーを持つ野党議員団に加わったことで、中央政府が基地問題をはじめとした沖縄政策そのものを推進することは、これまで以上に困難になろう。

 これら野党議員らは、参院選公示3日前に開催された「県民大会」にみられるように、反基地感情を政治利用している。実際、5月の殺人事件の被害者や遺族を考えるより、統一戦線を確認する政党大会のような雰囲気を帯びていた。

 伊波氏が(自称ではあるが事実ではない)「オール沖縄」として知られる反基地陣営の候補となることが確定した3月時点、自民党内部の調査で、伊波氏が島尻氏におよそ2対1の差をつけていることが判明した。それは一貫して6月末まで続いていた。

 伊波氏の支持者は、島尻氏がもともと沖縄出身ではなく、また、反動的と批判され、国防を重視する安倍総理に近いことを利用してネガティブキャンペーンを展開した。匿名で「あなたの子供や孫をもれなく戦争にご招待します!」と、間違った島尻氏像を伝える悪意のあるポスターをあちらこちらで張っていた。

 伊波氏は、過去の散々な選挙結果から、保守派の人々から過小評価を受けていた。彼に初めて会ったのは約20年前、まだ県議会議員だった頃だ。その当時、将来の県知事候補になるだろうという印象を自民党県連のトップに伝えたが、彼は「伊波氏は議員の任期を全うする」と言ってコメントをはねつけた。しかし、私は、伊波氏は選挙のために辞任するような人物であると感じていた。実際、宜野湾市長選に出馬するために、議員を辞職し、しかも当選した。

 10年に現職の仲井真弘多氏が県知事に再選したことで、伊波氏の人気は低迷した。筆者は当初、今回の参院選には出馬せず、子分を出すだろうと思った。ところが、極左政党と元自民系らで構成される「オール沖縄」との度重なる交渉で候補者に選ばれた。

 想定される取引は、18年に翁長雄志知事が再選されるという前提で、伊波氏が参院議員を1期務めた後、22年に翁長知事に後継として指名を受けるというシナリオだ。

 これは、「オール沖縄」幹部は明確な戦略を持っていて、ポストがすぐに埋まることを示している。これに対し、保守陣営は場当たり的で、戦略に欠け、人材も不足している。

 島尻氏は参院議員であり、また、自民党沖縄県連会長であり、内閣府特命担当大臣として沖縄・北方以外にも五つの分野を担当している。沖縄選出で沖縄振興問題を担当する与党議員が負けるというのは普通では考えられない。(ある意味、こうした人物を辞めさせ、閣僚から追い出すことは、沖縄の有権者にとって自滅行為だ)

 いずれにせよ、安倍政権にはポスト島尻の計画がないように思える。民間人として大臣を続けてもらうことも可能ではあるが。沖縄の自民党の問題点は第一に、先見性、計画性、知的誠実性および勇気に欠けることだ。

 今後数年間は、少なくとも沖縄と中央政府の間で、政策面での困難が続くであろう。

 民主主義とは言え、自殺も自らの意思で進むものだ。極めて残念な結果になった。

 沖縄県という重要な県で、自民党が再建され、沖縄政策全体が見直され、責任ある野党が生まれることを心から希望する。

The Upper House Elections and Future of Okinawa

 When examining election results and providing analysis on a particular election, there are often a number of factors to weigh—voter turnout, party support, international and domestic politics, local sentiment, and the candidates’ popularity, etc.

 There are also two ways of looking at elections. Was the victory of one candidate over another the result of the winning candidate’s efforts, or the result of the poor showing of the losing candidate?

 If this question were phrased in the context of the July 10 Upper House election in Okinawa, it would go: “Did the challenger, Iha Yōichi, win the election in his own right, or did Shimajiri Aiko, the incumbent, simply lose it?”

 If I were asked this question, I would say the answer was the latter—Shimajiri lost it more than Iha won it. Some may feel this is too strong a criticism, but as someone who has closely observed and written about Okinawan politics and policy over the past 20 years, I cannot help but describe it this way.

 This is not to say she is not a good person—she is—or that she did not try hard as a politician and cabinet minister—she did—or that there were not accusations of election violations by the Iha camp—there were many.

 It means that the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s style of postponing difficult decisions and failing to face reality got it in trouble in Okinawa. She was warned in the fall of 2014 by knowledgeable people that she faced defeat but chose not to address the challenges head on. Similarly, the Abe Shinzō administration was warned in 2013 that it faced defeat in the Okinawa gubernatorial election in November 2014, but it chose to ignore that advice.

 Readers know the results: not only did the incumbent governor, supported by the LDP and running for a third term, was heavily defeated, and in December that year, the four Lower House candidates representing the ruling LDP were all defeated. And now Shimajiri, first elected in 2007, and re-elected in 2010, was defeated by a huge margin (100,000 votes).

 This means that all four Lower House members and both Upper House members (the other being Itokazu Keiko of the Okinawa Social Masses Party) elected in their own right are all from the opposition parties and anti-base in their stances, and especially against the move of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to the waters off of Camp Schwab as proposed in the original Special Action Committee on Okinawa recommendations of 1996 and reconfirmed in the 2006 realignment agreement. This has never happened in post-reversion history before.

 The above six do not include those who were elected through proportional representation seats, but they are considered somewhat “second class” in that they were defeated in their own constituencies. Even with these additional members, implementation of central government policies for Okinawa, particularly as they concern basing matters, may be even more challenging henceforth, especially with a vocal and volatile Iha working in conjunction with his fellow ideologues.

 These ideologues used anti-base sentiment to their advantage, including the people’s rally held in late June, a couple of days before the campaign officially started. Indeed, the rally took on the atmosphere of a political convention to confirm the degree of cohesion of the united front rather than a gathering to remember the victim of the murder in May.

 Nevertheless, the rape and murder of a local Okinawan woman allegedly by a U.S. citizen and former Marine working at Kadena Air Base did not majorly affect the outcome of the election. Internal LDP of Shimajiri and Iha showed the latter leading by a 2-1 margin from the outset in March when it became clear Iha would be the candidate of the anti-base united front known by its misnomer, “All Okinawa.”

 Iha’s supporters took advantage of Shimajiri’s not being from Okinawa originally and her closeness to Prime Minister Abe (who is seen as a pro-defense reactionary), running a negative campaign against her with unattributable, mean posters misportraying her as being willing to send voters’ children and grandchildren to war.

 Iha has historically been under-rated by the conservatives, with devastating consequences. I first met him about twenty years ago when he was a member of the prefectural assembly. I saw him as a future gubernatorial candidate and so mentioned this to a member of the LDP who dismissed my comment by saying that Iha was still serving his term in the assembly. To me, however, I could see him giving up his seat to run. This he eventually did, but for the Ginowan mayoral election, which he won.

 He subsequently gave up his office as mayor to run in the 2010 gubernatorial election, which he lost. As mayor he encouraged protest movements against Futenma, and actively participated in those activities at Nodake Gate. When the CH-53 crashed in August 2004, he became the face of Okinawa as Governor Inamine Keiichi was abroad at the time.

 His popularity dropped for a while following his loss to incumbent Nakaima Hirokazu in 2010. I initially did not think he would run this time, instead having one of his allies from Ginowan do so, but he was chosen through a variety of deals within the “All Okinawa” coalition of leftist parties and LDP breakaways.

 One of the likely deals is that he will be chosen by Governor Onaga Takeshi to succeed him in 2022, after serving one term in the Upper House, on the assumption that Onaga is re-elected in 2018.

 This shows that the All Okinawa front has a clear strategy, and slots filled, whereas the conservatives take it one election at a time and lack both a strategy and the personnel to fill the positions.

 Shimajiri served not only as a member of the Upper House but also as the chairperson of the Okinawa Prefectural Chapter of the LDP and the Minister for Okinawan and Northern Territories Affairs, as well as five other ministerial positions. It is unprecedented that someone in her position—representing Okinawa in the ruling party and serving as the minister in charge of Okinawan development matters—to lose. (In a sense it is also self-defeating for Okinawan voters to boot that person from office, as the representative replacing her from Okinawa would no longer be in the cabinet anymore.)

 In any case, the Abe administration appears to have no post-Shimajiri plan, even though it can retain her in the position as a member of the private sector. This lack of foresight and planning, and intellectual honesty and courage, is what got the LDP in trouble in Okinawa in the first place.

 We can expect the next several years to be equally difficult, if not more, in relations between Okinawa and the central government, and on the policy front.

 While indeed this was democracy—the people’s will—at work, we can also say that suicide is the same—a person’s will at work. This was not a good day for Okinawa.

 I hope at any rate, it leads to the rebuilding of the Okinawa Chapter of the ruling LDP, the reexamination of policy for Okinawa in general, and the development of a responsible opposition here in this important prefecture.